

Message Text

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USLO PEKING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 1967

LIMDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CH, UR

SUBJ: SOVIET VIEWS OF CHINA AFTER THE NPC; THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES

1. SUMMARY: IN A WIDE-RANGING CONVERSTATION ON CHINA AFTER THE NPC, IGOR ROGACHEV, DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE SOVIET MFA'S FIRST FAR EAST DIVISION (CHINA), STRESSED THAT MOSCOW FEELS THAT MAO AND THE "LEFTISTS" HAVE RETAINED CONSIDERABLE POWER AND THAT THE STRUGGLE FOR ULTIMATE CONTROL STILL GOES ON. HE CLAIMED THAT THE "RADICALS" DOMINATE WHAT IS, IN EFFECT, THE SECRETARIAT OF THE PARTY AND THAT THE NEW CONSTITUTION'S ASSERTION OF PARTY PRIMACY IS INTENDED TO ENSURE THAT THEY WILL EVENTUALLY ASSUME A DOMINANT POSITION. NOT ALL OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT APPOINTMENTS ARE CHOU-ISTS, SAID ROGACHEV, AND MAO DOES NOT WANT CHOU TO BE HIS SUCCESSOR.
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AUTHORITY OVER THE PLA HAD BEEN DIFFUSED TO PREVENT THE

CONCENTRATION OF POWER IN THE HANDS OF ONE MAN, AND MAO'S ABSENCE WAS NOTABLE, SHOWING THAT HE DISAPPROVED OF CHOU'S NPC. ROGACHEV DISCUSSED CHOU'S ECONOMIC REPORT IN SOME DETAIL, AND DENIED THAT THERE HAD BEEN ANY INCREASE IN TENSIONS ON THE SINO-SOVIET OR SINO-MONGOLIAN BORDERS. END SUMMARY.

2. POLITICAL COUNSELOR CALLED ON ROGACHEV FEBRUARY 10 TO DISCUSS THE NPC AND RELATED QUESTIONS. RAGACHEV BEGAN BY ASSERTING THAT THE PRIMARY CONCLUSION OF SOVIET ANALYSTS IS THAT THE DIVIDED LEADERSHIP REMAINS DIVIDED AND THAT THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER CONTINUES. THE NPC FAILED TO RESOLVE THE UNDERLYING STRUGGLE FOR POWER, HE SAID. ON THE SURFACE ALL APPEARED STABLE, WITH PEOPLE FINALLY NAMED TO FILL ALL OF THE MINISTERIAL VACANCIES. BUT PARTY LEADERSHIP IS STILL IN THE HANDS OF THE SHANGHAI RADICALS.

3. HE THEN LISTED FOUR MAJOR REASONS FOR HAVING REACHED THIS CONCLUSION. FIRST OF ALL, ROGACHEV SAID, WANG HUNG-WEN, CHIANG CHING AND YAO WEN-YUAN REMAIN IN CONTROL OF WHAT IS IN EFFECT THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. IT IS THE SECRETARIAT, HE SAID, WHICH IS THE ULTIMATE KEY TO POWER IN ANY SOCIALIST SYSTEM. WHEN ASKED WHETHER THIS ALLEGED CONTROL OF THE PARTY MACHINERY BY THE RADICALS WAS BASED ON HARD EVIDENCE OR ONLY ON SUPPOSITION, ROGACHEV SMILED AND SAID, "BOTH." HE INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE VERY SURE OF THIS BUT CITED NO SPECIFIC EVIDENCE TO BACK UP THIS POINT. IN ADDITION TO PARTY CONTROL, ROGACHEV SAID THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RADICALS' POSITION IS FURTHER ENHANCED BY THEIR CONTROL OF THE MASS ORGANIZATIONS, ESPECIALLY THE LABOR UNIONS, THE YOUTH AND THE WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS.

4. ROGACHEV'S SECOND POINT WAS THAT NOT EVEN ALL OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT APPOINTEES GIVE PRIMARY LOYALTY TO CHOU. SOME ARE CLOSER TO THE SHANGHAI GROUP, HE SAID. IN THE LATTER CATEGORY, HE NAMED CHANG CHUN-CHIAO, HUA KUO-FENG AND THE NEW CULTURE MINISTER. THESE PEOPLE ALL OCCUPY SENSITIVE POSITIONS, EXPECIALLY HUA AS MINISTER OF PUBLIC SECURITY. THEIR PRESENCE IN THESE ROLES WILL ENSURE THAT LEFTIST INFLUENCE

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IS MAINTAINED IN THE GOVERNMENT ITSELF.

5. THIRDLY, CONTINUED ROGACHEV, THE NEW CONSTITUTION INSTITUTIONALIZES THE DOMINANCE OF PARTY AUTHORITY. IN ALL SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, HE POINTED OUT, THE PARTY IS THE LEADING ELEMENT. BUT OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE NOT SPECIFICALLY FELT THE NEED TO WRITE THIS INTO THE STATE CONSTITUTION. THE EFFECT OF THIS MOVE IS TO INSTITUTIONALIZE EXPLICIT

PARTY CONTROL OVER THE GOVERNMENT. THIS WAS DONE, HE SAID, IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN THE LEFTISTS FOR THE PERIOD OF ULTIMATE STRUGGLE AFTER MAO DEPARTS THE SCENE.

6. ROGACHEV'S FOURTH POINT WAS THAT THE SOVIETS HAD HARD EVIDENCE OF LONGSTANDING ANTIPATHY BETWEEN MAO AND CHOU. MAO HAS NO DESIRE TO SEE CHOU AS HIS SUCCESSOR, FAR PREFERS THE SHANGHAI GROUP, AND WILL SEEK TO PROMOTE THEIR INTERESTS, HE SAID. NEW FORMS OF STRUGGLE WILL THEREFORE EMERGE, HE ASSERTED, LIKE THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION OR THE CAMPAIGN TO CRITICIZE LIN PAIO AND CONFUCIUS, BUT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO GUESS THE FORM THESE STURGGLES WILL TAKE. MAO DOES NOT TRUST CHOU; CHOU KNOWS TOO MUCH. IT WAS THE SAME WITH LIU CHAO-CHI AND LINPIAO. SO-CALLED "ANTI-PARTY" ELEMENTS ARE STILL STRONG AND WILL REMAIN SO.

7. FURTHERMORE, THE NEW STRUCTURE OF THE PLA, ESPECIALLY ITS HIERARCHY OF COMMAND, IS LAYERED AND CONFUSED AND WILL ENSURE CONTINUED STRUGGLE, ROGACHEV SAID. THE POINT OF THE RESTRUCTURING WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE, HE SAID, WAS TO KEEP THE PLA IN LINE AND OUT OF THE HANDS OF ONE INDIVIDUAL, LIKE LIN PIAO. THE RESULT IS THAT NO ONE BELOW MAO HAS ANY CLEAR AUTHORITY. THERE IS MUCH INSTABILITY IN THE ARMY NOW, ROGACHEV ASSERTED, AND LINGERING SUPPORT FOR LIN PIAO EXISTS AT ALL LEVELS.

8. MAO'S ABSENCE FROM THE NPC AND ESPECIALLY THE PARTY PLENUM WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT, ROGACHEV SAID, AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE WAS OBVIOUS, PARTICULARLY AFTER MAO SAW STRAUSS DURING THE NPC SESSION. NO CHINESE COULD MISS SUCH A SIGNAL, ROGACHEV ASSERTED. MAO APPROVED THE CONSTI-TUTION, BUT NOT THE COURSE OF THE NPC. CHOU CALLED FOR LONG-TERM PLANNING AND THE NPC RESOLUTIONS WERE HIS WORK. MAO
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WANTED NONE OF THAT. HE LOVES REVOLUTION AND IS AN OLD DREAMER WHO CANNOT BE BOTHERED BY PRACTICAL PROCESSES.

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9. TURNING TO CHOU EN-LAI'S SPEECH, ROGACHEV NOTED THAT THE PORTION ABOUT LONG-TERM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BRINGING CHINA TO THE FRONT RANKS IN THAT REGARD WAS FOLLOWED BY THE ASSERTION THAT A SOVIET-U.S. WAR WAS INEVITABLE. THIS JUXTAPOSITION SHOWS THE DIRECTION OF CHINESE THINKING, HE SAID, I.E., THE PRC WILL ACHIEVE ITS ECONOMIC AIM ONLY AFTER SUCH A WAR OCCURS. WHILE THERE ARE MANY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PRAGMATISTS AND THE LEFTISTS, THEY BOTH AGREE THAT PRC POLICY SHOULD BE TO MAKE CHINA INTO A SUPERPOWER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. PEKING'S CURRENT REITERATION THAT IT NEVER INTENDS TO BECOME A SUPERPOWER IS NONSENSE, HE SAID.

10. ON ECONOMIC MATTERS, ROGACHEV NOTED THAT CHOU GAVE ONLY PERCENTAGE INCREASES OVER 1964 IN HIS SPEECH, BUT
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SOVIET BASE TOTALS FOR 1964 WERE MORE OR LESS RELIABLE, AND ONE COULD EXTRAPOLATE FROM THOSE. HE ADMITTED THAT CHINA HAD MADE SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC STRIDES IN SOME AREAS, BUT NOTED THAT SOVIET EXPERTS SEE LESS DRAMATIC CHANGES THAN CHINA CLAIMS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF OIL WHERE THEY ACCEPT CHINESE FIGURES AS ACCURATE. ON GNP, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIETS

BELIEVE THAT THE FIGURE FOR INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION (NOT INCLUDING SERVICES) IS ABOUT 130 MILLION RUBLES, NOT 176 MILLION AS CHOU'S FIGURES WOULD IMPLY. ON FOOD GRAINS, CHOU'S FIGURES WORK OUT TO 259 MILLION METRIC TONS, BUT THE SOVIETS ESTIMATE ONLY 235. ON POWER OUTPUT, CHOU'S FIGURE COMES TO ABOUT 120 BILLION KILOWATT HOURS; THE SOVIETS ESTIMATE 95-100. ON PETROLEUM, CHOU'S FIGURE WORKS OUT TO 60-65 MILLION METRIC TONS, WHICH IS ABOUT RIGHT. CHOU'S FIGURE ON COAL WOULD BE 400 M.M.T., THE SOVIETS ESTIMATE 320; ON COTTON, CHOU'S FIGURE WOULD BE 2.5 M.M.T., THE SOVIETS SAY 2.3. ON POPULATION, CHOU REPEATED THE EARLIER FIGURE OF "ABOUT 800 MILLION," BUT THE SOVIETS ESTIMATE THAT IT COULD NOT POSSIBLY BE LESS THAN 830 MILLION AND WAS PROBABLY FAR GREATER THAN THAT. FOREIGN TRADE, HE SAID, WAS \$12.3 BILLION WITH A SUBSTANTIAL DEFICIT IN THE CHINESE TRADE ACCOUNT. TRADE WITH THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, HE SAID, HAD NOT CHANGED MUCH. WITH THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE IT WOULD GROW ABOUT 5 TO 10 PERCENT THIS YEAR, BUT NOT WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE CHINESE, HE SAID, WANT TO HOLD THAT TRADE DOWN. MEANWHILE, OIL EXPORTS TO JAPAN WERE GOING AHEAD STRONGLY--OVER FOUR MILLION TONS IN 1974 AND EIGHT OR SO EXPECTED IN 1975.

11. ROGACHEV SAID THAT THE SITUATION ALONG THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER REMAINED CALM. AS ALWAYS, THERE ARE MINOR PROBLEMS INVOLVING FISHERMEN AND HERDSMEN BUT THESE ARE NOT SERIOUS. THE SINO-MONGOLIAN BORDER IS ALSO CALM, HE SAID.

12. ROGACHEV THEN ASKED FOR OUR VIEWS ON THE NPC, AND WE REPLIED THAT U.S. ANALYSES WE HAD SEEN STRESSED CHOU'S PREDOMINANCE AND EMPHASIS ON LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT AS INDICATORS OF RELATIVE STABILITY. THE ROLE OF THE ARMY REMAINED A MAJOR QUESTION MARK, AND STRUGGLE OF SOME SORT WOULD NO DOUBT CONTINUE. BUT WE DID NOT SEE THE SO-CALLED RADICALS AS GAINERS IN THIS ROUND; IN FACT, THE EVIDENCE WOULD

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APPEAR TO INDICATE THAT THEY MAY HAVE BEEN THE BIG LOSERS.

13. COMMENT: IF DEPARTMENT OR OTHER ADDRESSEES HAVE FURTHER SPECIFIC QUESTIONS RE SOVIET ESTIMATES OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA, BELIEVE WE WOULD HAVE NO TROUBLE PUTTING THEM TO ROGACHEV, WHO IS FRIENDLY, COMPARATIVELY FRANK, AND --AFTER HIS FIVE-YEAR TOUR IN WASHINGTON--USED TO DEALING WITH AMERICANS. IN THIS REGARD, SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON ROGACHEV'S REMARKS WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL AND WOULD BE APPRECIATED BY HIM.

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